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The Rehnquist Court is well known for its many five-four decisions in favor of
enhanced state power. The author demonstrates a less well known fact about
this Court's five-member state-power majority--that they have no common
theory of federalism. The author re-examines the principal, concurring, and
dissenting opinions of the five state-power Justices in the current Court's major
federalism opinions-most recently limiting the enforceability of the Americans
with Disabilities Act and striking down the Violence Against Women Act-in
order to derive each Justice's distinct theory offederalism. He then contrasts the
theories with each other, uncovering a buried dispute over the basis of our
federalist system, and revealing the disturbing fact that, behind the state-power
quintet's several recent increases in state power vis-i-vis national power, there
lies no majority theory on which these changes are based.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Common wisdom says that the five conservative Justices on the current
Supreme Court are unified in favor of enhanced state power. This note
demonstrates the superficiality of this unity. In particular, although the five
conservative Justices almost unfailingly manage to cobble together their
signatures to achieve the result of enhanced state power-against the unfailing
dissent of the four more liberal Justices-there is little agreement among the
conservative Justices on the theoretical basis for enhancing state power.
The current United States Supreme Court has decided at least eleven cases
with major federalism implications.1 Ten of these cases were decided in favor of
increased state sovereign power.2 Each of these eleven cases divided the Court
into the same five-four split-Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas in the majority, and Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer in the dissent. The anomaly is US. Term Limits v.
Thornton,3 which goes against state sovereignty due to Justice Kennedy's
concurrence with the normally opposing camp.
I Although Justice O'Connor has called federalism "perhaps our oldest question of
constitutional law," New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992), it has not lost its
vitality with age. "[T]here is no disputing that the current Supreme Court is more interested
than any Court in recent history in reexamining and reconsidering 'first principles' of our
federal system. This renaissance of an interest in federalism may mark yet another significant
period in American constitutional history." Richard E. Levy & Stephen R. McAllister, Defining
the Roles of the National and State Governments in the American Federal System: A
Symposium, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 971,973 (1997) (internal citation omitted). "After more than
fifty years spent largely on the sidelines, the Court has reentered the fray, seeking to enforce a
commitment to federalism on several fronts... .' H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic
Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REv. 849, 850 (1999). As
Professor Edward Rubin has said, "Federalism is indeed worth discussing; it is a basic, truly
fundamental question of political organization." Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and
Irrelevance ofFederalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (1997).
Justice O'Connor uncontroversially described federalism as a "question as old as the
Constitution: It consists of discerning the proper division of authority between the Federal
Government and the States." New York 505 U.S. at 149.
2 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001), discussed infra Part
lK, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), discussed infra Part II.J; Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), discussed infra Part 11.1; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999), discussed infra Part II.H; Coll. Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999), discussed infra Part II.G; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), discussed infra Part II.F; Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), discussed infra Part ]I.E; Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
521 U.S. 261 (1997), discussed infra Part I.D; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996),
discussed infra Part Ml.C; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), discussed infra Part IIA
3 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), discussed infra Part ll.B.
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These eleven federalism cases contain thirty-eight opinions. The contrast
between the consistency in results and the diversity in opinions is stunning. This
contrast suggests that the ongoing battle in the Court to determine the appropriate
balance between state power and national power is not being waged between two
philosophically unified camps. Rather, as this note argues, these federalism cases
are decided based on a partial convergence of diverse philosophies of federalism.
A corollary of this conclusion is that the emergent federalist theory behind any
one of these decisions will not necessarily be the same as the emergent federalist
theory behind another. Thus, to truly understand the current Court's federalism
jurisprudence, it is necessary to look beyond the majority opinions of the Court
and to analyze the diversity of theories. This will result in an understanding of
how the theories differ and where they converge, thus making sense of the
differing emergent theories represented in specific cases.4
The goal of this note is not to argue for any particular view of federalism;
such arguments abound elsewhere.5 Rather, this note argues that, although the
five conservative Justices are managing to come together into a five-four
majority in favor of increased state power on almost every federalism case, their
individual federalist theories conflict intensely. Therefore, the five-member state-
4 This project is parallel to, but importantly different from, that of Ann Althouse,
Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J.
979 (1993). Not only did that article look at a different set of Justices, but, more importantly, it
examined the convergence of divergent normative theories of federalism. In contrast, the
purpose of this note is to examine the convergence of divergent descriptive theories of
federalism. Normative federalism addresses the purposes of federalism; descriptive federalism
discerns what federalist structure is dictated by the Constitution.
5 For some recent arguments, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
96 YALE LJ. 1425 (1987); Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the
Court's "Unsteady Path " A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1447 (1995); Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on
the New Federalism and the Orinal Understanding, 94 MCH. L. REV. 615 (1995); Laura S.
Fitzgerald, Beyond Marbury: Jurisdictional Self-Dealing in Seminole Tnbe, 52 VAND. L. REV.
407 (1999); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795
(1996); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses
and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998); Deborah Jones
Merritt, The Third Translation of the Commerce Clause: Congressional Power to Regulate
Social Problems, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1206 (1998); Moulton, supra note 1; H. Jefferson
Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993); Michael B.
Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme
Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 819 (1999); Donald H.
Regan, How to Think about the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995); John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining
Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 27 (1998); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of
Federalism, 70 S. CAL L. REV. 1311 (1997).
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power wing of the Court does not itself have a unified theory of federalism on
which the several increases in state power are based.6 Rather, these Justices
repeatedly cobble together their five-member majority while, in concurring
opinions, arguing with each other about the bases of the decisions.
Part I sets the stage for the examination of these arguments by outlining the
cases in question. Part III looks at each Justice in the state-power quintet
individually, and argues, based on the evidence of the several opinions in the
cases, for conclusions of what each of these Justices' theory of federalism is, and
how it differs from the other Justices' theories. Finally, Part IV briefly considers
the theories together, and makes some concluding observations about why this
tangle of theories---resulting in this lack of a unified federalist theory behind the
Supreme Court's cases-while disturbing, should not be surprising.
MI. THE CASES
This part gives brief synopses of each of the eleven cases mentioned above,7
focusing on their importance to the federalism battle, along with an introductory
sketqh of the various philosophies of federalism represented in each case's state-
power opinions. This part culls the federalist import of the cases themselves,
before digging into an analysis of each majority Justice's philosophy of
federalism throughout the cases.
A. United States v. Lopez
In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.8 This Act
made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone." 9 In United States v. Lopez the Court struck down the Act as
unconstitutional.1 0 The principal basis of the majority opinion was that the Act
6
"The [federalism] decisions are inconsistent ... with one another, and they lack a
persuasive normative theory to... resolve [this inconsistency]." Bednar & Eskridge, supra
note 5, at 1447.
7 See supra notes 2-3.
8 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. V 1993).
9 § 922(qc(1)(A).
10 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (affirming the Fifth Circuit's striking
down of the Act). "Lopez was the first time since Carter v. Carter Coal Co., [298 U.S. 238
(193d),] decided fifty-nine years before-in the spring of 1936, the fourth year of Franldin
Roosevelt's first term--that the Court held that Congress had passed a law that exceeded its
authority under the Commerce Clause." Judge Louis H. Pollak, Foreword, 94 MCH. L. REV.
533, 535 (1995).
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was an invalid attempt by Congress to use its Commerce Clause power.11 The
federalism issue here was the proper scope of federal powers and state powers.
That is, the question was whether the type of act outlawed by the Gun-Free
School Zones Act is one that is within the power of the federal government, or
whether it is instead one exclusively within the power of the state governments.
The Commerce Clause has been long used by Congress to regulate activity
within states, and the states have long fought federal Commerce Clause
regulation of activities within their borders.12 A result of this battle is what
Justice Thomas calls the Supreme Court's "substantial effects" test for whether
Congress has legitimately used its Commerce Clause power.13 That is, the Court
does not read the Clause strictly to limit Congress's power to regulate commerce
only "among the several States." Rather, federal regulation founded on this
clause is not ultra vires if the regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate
commerce.14
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that the power to criminalize
possession of handguns within school zones is outside the scope of federal
power. According to this opinion, the federal government was attempting to
usurp state power by regulating a type of activity that the Constitution puts
exclusively within the states' sphere of power. The substantial effects test is, of
course, a ftzzy test open to diverse interpretation. The majority drew the
substantial effects line so as not to include handgun possession in school zones,
and its reason seemed to be a fear that the line has to be drawn somewhere, or
else our federalist system would be destroyed. The majority was worried that if it
did not put some limit on Commerce Clause power, the clause would
11 Id The Commerce Clause is found at U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall
have Power... To regulate Commerce... among the several States... ").
12 See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CoNsTrrUTIoNAL LAW 141-227
(13th ed. 1997).
13 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also id. at 615-16 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting Justice Breyer's acquiescence in the use of this label for the purposes of this
case). Justice Breyer points out that the precedential cases have not consistently used the
"substantial effects" language: "I use the word 'significant' because the word 'substantial'
implies a somewhat narrower power than recent precedent suggests .... But to speak of
'substantial effect' rather than 'significant effect' would make no difference in this case." Id. at
616 (internal citations omitted).
14 As discussed more fully infra Part I1.E, Justice Thomas thinks the substantial-effects
test gives Congress too much power "[W]e must... respect a constitutional line that does not
grant Congress power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce.' Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 593 (Thomas, J., concurring). In fact, he believes the substantial effects test removes all
limits on congressional power "Under our jurisprudence, if Congress passed an omnibus
'substantially affects interstate commerce' statute, purporting to regulate every aspect of human
existence, the Act apparently would be constitutional." Id. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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'effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local
and create a completely centralized government.""'15
Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, expressed his desire to overrule the
Court's opinions that led to its substantial effects test.16 In his view, this test,
rather than limiting federal power, actually removes all limits on federal power
and "grant[s] Congress a police power over the Nation." 17 He sees the current
test as "but an innovation of the 20th century" I8 and would prefer to return to
what he sees as the "original understanding" of the Commerce Clause.19 This
original understanding, he argued, limits the clause to its literal text, as
understood at the time of ratification, in the context of interstate commerce as it
existed at the time of ratification. The Clause, he claims, properly grants
Congress power to regulate only the actual trafficking of merchandise across
state borders2 °
Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice
O'Connor. They appeared to barely agree with the majority.2 1 They highlighted
the fundamental difference between our nation's economic system today and at
the time of constitutional ratification. They urged that the Court's difficulty in
generating a single Commerce Clause test to account for this change "counsels
great restraint before the Court determines that the Clause is insufficient to
support an exercise of the national power."22 This emphasis on the crucial
changes in commerce that have taken place since ratification was presumably a
response to Justice Thomas's desire to all but ignore these factual changes in a
15 Lopes, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
37 (1937)).
16
"Presumably, Justice Thomas would overrule United States v. Darby [, 312 U.S. 100
(1941),] and other decisions interpreting the Commerce Clause to allow the federal government
effectively to exercise a police power over the states." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling
Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARv. L. REv. 78, 106-07 (1995).
17 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring).
18 Id. at 596 (Thomas, J., concurring).
19 Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
20 "Commerce," as understood two hundred years ago, did not include manufacturing or
agriculture. Id. at 585-593 (Thomas, J., concurring).
21 They stated that the decision gave them "pause," that the Court should exercise "great
restraint" in this area, that the principal holding is "limited," id. at 568 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), that "the intrusion on state sovereignty may not be as severe in this instance as in
some of [their] recent Tenth Amendment cases," id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and they
even expressed support for the policy behind the law that they struck down. Id. at 581
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
22 Id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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return to the "original understanding" of the Clause.2 3 They wrote to emphasize
that, though the holding in Lopez was "necessary," it was also "limited. '24 They
discussed at length the importance of maintaining a "balance" between national
and state power, apparently in opposition to Justice Thomas's desire to swing
that balance much more toward the states.25 Most important to them was their
point that this federal-state balance should be left largely to the political system.
The judiciary, they argued, should not intervene to declare absolutely where this
divide in power should be, unless truly "one or the other level of Government has
tipped the scales too far."26 Thus, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor believe that,
although the Gun Free School Zones Act did tip the scales of power too far
toward the federal government, the Court ought usually to avoid Commerce
Clause cases and, instead, to accord Congress "substantial discretion and control
over the federal balance."2 7
Lopez is thus a rich source of ideological dispute among the five Justices
making up the majority in most of the current Court's federalism cases. It is
especially apparent in this case how starkly opposed Justice Thomas is to
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor regarding the proper federal-state balance under
the Commerce Clause and the proper means of determining that balance.
Divergent as these theories of federalism are, they nevertheless converge enough
to create federalist jurisprudence through specific cases such as Lopez. The
divergence and convergence of these individual theories will be analyzed more
thoroughly below. 28 The next case to enter into this analysis, however, quickly
complicates the landscape.
B. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
Although US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton29 complicates the analysis, it
also makes the analysis much more interesting. Term Limits, decided less than a
month after Lopez, came down in favor ofnational power and limited state power
23 Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
25
"Justice Thomas's concurrence would have pushed the Court's majority much
farther.... Implicit in Justice Thomas's opinion ... is a standard that would invalidate many
comprehensive congressional enactments whose constitutionality is scarcely controversial,
including federal civil rights statutes, the antitrust laws, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.'
Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's
Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213,2227-28 (1996).
26 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
27 Id at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
28 See infra Part M.
29 514 US. 779 (1995).
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due to Justice Kennedy joining the usually opposing camp. It is the only major
federalism case decided by the currently sitting Supreme Court to be resolved
against states. It thus stands as an indication of certain limits on the Court's shift
toward state power.
Term Limits can be distinguished from Lopez in that it did not involve a
federal attempt to grab power, but rather a state attempt. Also, it implicated not
the Commerce Clause but the Qualifications Clauses.30 However, both cases
involved strong debate over the proper balance of federal and state powers under
the Constitution.
Term Limits struck down as unconstitutional an amendment to the Arkansas
State Constitution that imposed term limits on the state's candidates for the
United States Congress.31 The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens and
joined by, among others,32 Justice Kennedy, held that the power to impose
qualifications on congressional candidates is solely within the federal
government's sphere of power, and outside of state governments' sphere of
power. The Court's fundamental constitutional basis for this result was its
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, which reads: "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."33 The focus of the dispute
was the word "reserved." "First, we conclude that the power to add qualifications
is not within the 'original powers' of the states, and thus is not reserved to the
States by the Tenth Amendment.' 34 The majority's view, then, is that for a
power to be "reserved" to the States, it must have already been in the states at the
time of unification. The Tenth Amendment, under this interpretation, allows the
states to keep the powers that the Constitution did not take from them, but it does
3 0 The Qualifications Clauses are: U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2 ("No person shall be a
Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that
State in which he shall be chosen."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 ("No Person shall be a
Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of
the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he
shall be chosen."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. I (CEach House shall be the Judge of the...
Qualifications of its own Members.").
31 ARK. CONST. amend. 73, § 3, amended by ARK. CONST. amend. 76 (1996). In
particular, Amendment 73 made the term limits a barrier to ballot access for otherwise eligible
candidates for Congress. Write-in candidates could win despite having served beyond the term
limits.
32 Justice Stevens's opinion was joined by Justices Souter, Breyer, Ginsberg, and
Kennedy. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 781.
3 3 U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
34 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 800.
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not itself place any new powers in the states. The Tenth Amendment "could only
'reserve' that which existed before." 35
Prior to unification, the majority reasoned, because there was no Congress
and thus were no congressional candidates, there was no power to impose
qualifications on the candidates.36 Therefore, necessarily, the states did not
possess such a power, and the Tenth Amendment cannot have "reserved" it to
them.
Justice Thomas, in his dissent,37 took issue with the majority's interpretation
of the Tenth Amendment. He took the polar opposite view that the "reserved"
language is an affirmative grant of powers to the states, rather than a means of
allowing them to keep their remaining pre-unification powers.38 His opinion,
then, is that the state sphere of power is universal except where power is
explicitly taken away from states by the Constitution.39 Therefore, even though it
may be true that, prior to unification, there was no power in anyone to impose
qualifications on congressional candidates, the states now have this power
because the constitution does not clearly say they do not have it.40
35 Id. at 802.
36 Id at 803 ("With respect to setting qualifications for service in Congress, no such right
existed before the Constitution was ratified.').
37 Note that this is the only federalism opinion written by Justice Thomas that is joined by
any other Justice. (He is joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and O'Connor).
Id. at 781. It is not coincidental that this anomaly is coupled with the anomaly that these
Justices are in dissent on a federalism case. As this note will demonstrate, Justice Thomas's
vision of federalism is too extreme on the side of state power for any other Justice to help make
it law. See infra Part fII.E.
38 See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (opining that "the majority
fundamentally misunderstands the notion of 'reserved' powers").
39 Professor Sullivan aptly called this view "a declaration of the primordial sovereignty of
the states." Sullivan, supra note 16, at 109. Charles Fried described the first part of Justice
Thomas's dissent as involving a:
perhaps too exuberant, celebration.., of the priority of state over national citizenship and [a]
correspondingly heterodox claim that the "people" who formed the United States were the
people of the several states considered as clumped collectivities, rather than the people of the
newly constructed whole .... Perhaps the most startling thing-coming closest to
revolutionary-about the dissent is that four Justices were willing to sign on to the original
manifesto of part I.A.
Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions? 109 HARv. L. REv. 13, 14-15 (1995) (internal citations
omitted).
40 Another locus of disagreement in Term Limits was the language of the Qualifications
Clauses themselves. See supra note 30 for these Clauses. The majority argued from historical
record that, regardless of the Tenth Amendment, the framers' "original intent' was to make the
Qualifications Clauses exhaustive. That is, the Clauses were intended to describe all of the
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Most interesting for this note's purpose is Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion,4 1 in which he revealed why he split from his usual state-power majority
to create a federal-power majority in this case. The question in this case, he
wrote, is answered by the republican character of our federalist system. In
particular, the relationship between the people and their representatives in the
federal government is purely within the federal government's sphere of power,
and thus cannot be interfered with by states. He was opposed to his usual state-
power allies, he explained, because their "course of reasoning... might be
construed to disparage the republican character of the National Government."42
The "course of reasoning" he referred to was the dissent's challenge of the "well
settled" notion that the federal system was created by the American people as a
whole, "assert[ing] their political identity and unity of purpose," and not by or
through the states.43 The dissent's challenge of this precept, he said, "runs
counter to fundamental principles of federalism."44 Justice Kennedy was
apparently concerned with maintaining the essential duality of the federalist
system.45 For him, the republican relationship between the people as citizens of
the United States and their elected federal government is an essential pillar on the
national side of this federalist duality. He believes that just as our federalist
system requires spheres of state power inviolable by the national government, the
republican relationship between the people and their congressional
representatives is one of the necessary limits on state power.
Justice Kennedy argues (as do all the Justices) that the dual sovereignty of
our federal system, and our concomitant individual dual capacities as citizens of
qualifications for congressional candidates, and therefore, by implication, the states are
prohibited from adding qualifications. As the Court wrote, "even if States possessed some
original power in this area, we conclude that the Framers intended the Constitution to be the
exclusive source of qualifications for Members of Cgngress, and that the Framers thereby
'divested' States of any power to add qualifications.' Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 800-01. Justice
Thomas, too, looked at the historical record, but of course came to the opposite conclusion
about the framers' original intent. He argued that the Qualifications Clauses were intended as
mere minimum prerequisites for congressional candidacy: "the Framers did not want the people
of the States and their state legislatures to be constrained by too many qualifications imposed at
the national level," Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 875 (Thomas, J., dissenting), and that therefore the
states are free to add qualifications as they see fit.
41 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 838-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43 Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
44 Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
45 
"Justice Kennedy alone sees the Court's role in federalism disputes as a two-way
ratchet, stopping the states from 'invad[ing] the sphere of federal sovereignty' but also holding
the federal government 'within the boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon matters
reserved to the States."' Sullivan, supra note 16, at 103 (quoting Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 841
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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two sovereigns, are crucial for avoiding a single tyrannical government.46
Though he agrees with the state-power Justices on this issue, he believes that
they are wrong to assert that the people's national political identity is separate
and independent of their state political identity. These separate, independent,
political identities are fundamental to Justice Kennedy's view of federalism.
C. Seminole Tribe v. Florida
In 1996, Seminole Tribe v. Florida47 reunified the state-power wing of the
Supreme Court, after Justice Kennedy's brief foray to the opposing camp in
Term Limits. As in most of the other five-four Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity cases considered in this note,48 the five state-power Justices were
locked in unison in Seminole Tribe. In only the two most recent of these cases did
any Justice express even a reservation in a concurring opinion.49
Seminole Tribe held that Congress violated the Eleventh Amendment in
enacting the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.50 Although the Amendment does
not expressly say so,51 the Court held that the Amendment supports a limited
sovereign immunity in a state against suit by its citizens. Such immunity, Chief
Justice Rehnquist reasoned, is 'inherent in the nature of sovereignty.' 52 Indeed,
this follows easily from the Court's claim that total immunity from suit by any
individual is inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The Chief Justice believes, of
46 For an interesting argument against this dogmatically and nearly universally held
theory, see Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 909, 927-35 (1994) (arguing that "federalism does not
diffuse power in our system, but may actually act as an impediment to its diffusion").
47 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
48 See infra Parts I.F-I, K (discussing respectively: Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Coll. Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001)).
49 Note, however, that the sovereign immunity majority does break down when it comes
to Ex parte Young jurisdiction. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997),
discussed infra Part II.D.
50 Pub. L. No. 100-497, § 11, 102 Stat. 2467, 2475-79 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d) (1994)).
5 1 The Eleventh Amendment reads as follows: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
52 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)
(quoting Tim FEDERALsT No. 81, at 487 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961))).
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course, that states, though limited in the scope of their sovereign powers, retain
this aspect of sovereignty.
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned, the framers did not intend
the Constitution to grant "federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting
States."53 He then considered Congress's power to abrogate this Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity: "Was the Act in question passed pursuant to a
constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate?" 54 The Act in
question was ostensibly enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.55 His
conclusion was that, although the Indian Commerce Clause grants the federal
government exclusive power over regulation of Indian commerce, this alone is
not enough to give Congress authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity. In
fact, in Seminole Tribe, the only constitutional provision that Chief Justice
Rehnquist clearly said grants Congress power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity is Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Enforcement Clause.56
This is because "the Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding federal power at the
expense of state autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance of state and
federal power struck by the Constitution."57 Seminole Tribe also overruled the
Court's only previous case upholding non-Section-5 congressional abrogation of
state sovereign immunity.58 Therefore, although the Court did not come out and
say it, Seminole Tribe strongly suggests that, under the current state-power
quintet, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is the only legitimate basis for
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
D. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe5 9 once again splintered the five-member state-
power majority, though they still managed to agree enough to squeeze by another
five-four decision. The official majority opinion is contained in parts , II(A), and
III of Justice Kennedy's opinion.60 On the other hand, as Justice Souter's
53 Id..
54 Id. at 59.
55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving the Congress power to "regulate
Commerce... with the Indian Tnbes").
56 
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
57 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,455 (1976)).
58 See id. at 66 (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
59 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
60 Id at 263-70, 281-88.
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dissenting opinion points out,61 it appears that the de facto controlling result is
Justice O'Connor's opinion (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas).62
Coeur d'Alene Tribe principally concerns Ex parte Young jurisdiction.
Under the Young doctrine, even when the Eleventh Amendment bars suit, federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear a complaint for purely prospective injunctive
relief against a state officer.63 The plaintiff tribe in Coeur d'Alene Tribe
attempted to get Ex parte Young jurisdiction to enjoin state officers "from
regulating, permitting, or taking any action in violation of the Tribe's rights of
exclusive use and occupancy, quiet enjoyment, and other ownership interest in
[certain] submerged lands" held by the state.64 The majority opinion denied such
jurisdiction to the plaintiff. The basis for its denial was that, although the
complaint was formally within the requirements of the Young doctrine, in
substance it was the functional equivalent of a quiet title claim directly against
the state. A quiet title action against a state over submerged lands is, according to
the majority, barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. To allow a
plaintiff to avoid the Eleventh Amendment through crafty pleading alone,
"would be to adhere to an empty formalism." 65
So far as this reasoning goes, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas are in
agreement. However, in parts lI(B)-(D) of Justice Kennedy's opinion, he and
Chief Justice Rehnquist go off on their own.66 It is interesting to note that their
vision of federalism as it relates to Exparte Young jurisdiction is apparently too
much in favor of state power for even Justice Thomas. This observation
illuminates yet another complexity in the interaction of these five Justices'
individual theories of federalism.
Parts II(B)-(D) of Justice Kennedy's opinion67 present the position that Ex
parte Young jurisdiction should be further limited by the fact that state courts are
capable of determining federal questions:
A doctrine based on the inherent inadequacy of state forums would run counter to
basic principles of federalism....
61 Id. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting).
62 See id at 288-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
This appears to be the controlling result because, as will become clear, the basis for this opinion
is more limited than that for Justice Kennedy's, yet the result in this case is the same.
63 See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
64 Coeurd'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 265.
65 Id. at 270.
6 6 Id. at 270-0.
67 Iad
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... It is the right and duty of the States, within their own judiciaries, to interpret
and to follow the Constitution and all laws enacted pursuant to it subject to a litigant's
right of review in this Court in a proper case.68
In Justice Kennedy's view, the state-power side of federalism requires a case-by-
case balancing test when Exparte Young jurisdiction is otherwise satisfied. He
thinks that state interests, and especially states' interests in having claims against
them decided in their own state courts, should limit federal courts' application of
Exparte Young jurisdiction. He is not clear about how to apply this doctrine, but
what is clear is that Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas will not go that far in
favor of state power.
In Justice O'Connor's view, Ex parte Young jurisdiction should not be
eroded by a case-by-case analysis of particular state interests. 69 On the other
hand, she did agree that the Eleventh Amendment barred the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe case because, though the action formally invoked the Young doctrine, it
was in substance equivalent to a suit barred by the Eleventh Amendment.70 In
her view, "the principal opinion unnecessarily questions [the] basic principle of
federal law" that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a plaintiff from seeking
prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal rights.71 She wrote that
the Court's precedent "simply does not support the proposition that federal courts
must evaluate the importance of the federal right at stake before permitting an
officer's suit to proceed." 72
To make a preliminary observation, Coeur d'Alene Tribe is valuable to the
present investigation because it shows an area where the unity among the state-
power quintet breaks down even on the issue of Eleventh Amendment state
sovereign immunity. Here, we also see Justice Kennedy going further than
Justice Thomas in favor of state power, whereas the opposite seemed to be the
case in both Term Limits and Lopez. Of course, these paradoxes are
explainable,73 but they again illustrate the complexity and lack of basic
theoretical unity among the five-member state-power majority.
681d. at 275.
69 Id. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
72 Id. at 295 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73 See infra Part IV.
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E. Printz v. United States
In Printz v. United States74 we return to attempted gun regulation under the
Commerce Clause, but the majority is again splintered. Although all four of the
other state-power Justices joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion,75 Justices
O'Connor and Thomas expressed their reservations in solo concurring
opinions.76
Printz struck down temporary provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act77 that required state and local officers to carry out certain
background-check procedures that would later be carried out by federal officers.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion held that "such commands are fundamentally
incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty."78 He based this
conclusion on an original-understanding argument the "structure of the
Constitution," and the Court's precedent. Based on his analysis of history of
early congressional enactments, Justice Scalia concluded that there was no
"assumption that the Federal Government may command the States' executive
power in the absence of a particularized constitutional authorization."79 The
Court has held in several cases, he further stated, that the federal government
does not have this power.80
Most interesting for this note's purposes is Justice Scalia's reasoning based
on the federalist structure created by the Constitution. He started with the
common principle that our liberty is protected by the creation of dual sovereigns,
thus making the proper balance of power between these sovereigns of the utmost
importance.81 The framers, he continued, "rejected the concept of a central
government that would act upon and through the States, and instead designed a
system in which the state and federal governments would exercise concurrent
authority over the people. '82 Therefore, because Congress, through the
temporary provisions of the Brady Act was attempting to act through the states,
these provisions were in opposition to the federalist structure embodied in the
74 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
75
.1d. at 902-35.
76 Id. at 935-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 936-39 (Thomas, J., concurring).
77 Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 102, 107 Stat. 1536, 1536-39 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(s) (1994)).
78 Pingz, 521 U.S. at 935.
79 Id at 909.
80 Id. at 926. The cases he cited include: New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992);
FERCv. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); and Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
81 But see Rubin & Feeley, supra note 46, at 909, 927-35.
82 Printz, 521 U.S. at 919-20.
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Constitution. If the federal government were allowed to act through the states
like this, Justice Scalia declared, the "power of the Federal Government would be
augmented immeasurably. 83
Justice O'Connor agreed with the basic reasoning and conclusion of the
principal opinion.84 However, she briefly suggested three other interesting
positions she advocates. First, she suggested that she would support the
permanent provisions of the Brady Act. Second, she suggested that she would
support a reenactment of the invalidated interim provisions if they were
structured as conditions for state receipt of federal funds rather than as absolute
directives. This is noteworthy because Justice Scalia suggested obliquely in his
opinion that he might not uphold such a provision.85 Finally, Justice O'Connor
suggested that she was not opposed to the Act's "purely ministerial reporting
requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to the
Commerce Clause powers." 86 These statements all hinted at limits on the Court's
ability to attract a majority on other issues of state-power.
Justice Thomas added a concurring opinion expressing where his federalist
vision diverges from the majority's. First, he emphasized his always-strict
reading of the Tenth Amendment. He would read the Amendment to grant states
all powers that are not specifically given to the federal government by the
Constitution.87 Second, he reemphasized his desire to reduce Commerce Clause
power. And, in particular, Justice Thomas suggested that he would strike down
the entire Brady Act as beyond the boundaries of his interpretation of the
Commerce Clause power.88 These suggestions of Justice Thomas reveal again
how far his Commerce Clause views go in favor of state power.
83 Id. at 922.
84 Id. at 935-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 917-18.
86 Id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 936-37 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also supra note 39 (quoting commentary on
this view).
88 Printz, 521 U.S. at 936-39. Justice Thomas not so subtly suggested that he would also
strike down the Act based on the Second Amendment. That is, he would like to read the
Second Amendment as granting an individual right, contrary again to the Court's precedent.
See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the Second Amendment's
purpose is to give Congress power "to assure the continuation and render possible the
effectiveness of' government militias).
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F. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank
The next three cases were all decided on the same day by a unified state-
power quintet. In some respect, each increases state sovereign immunity, but not
necessarily based on the Eleventh Amendment. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank89 struck down the Patent and
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act90 insofar as it purported to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity in federal court from citizen claims of patent
infingement.
Chief Justice Rehnquist gave a strong reading to Seminole Tribe: "Seminole
Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity
pursuant to its Article I powers; hence the Patent Remedy Act cannot be
sustained under either the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause."91 However,
the Fourteenth Amendment remains as a means to abrogate state immunity.92
Fourteenth Amendment abrogation, however, must satisfy the standard set out in
City of Boerne v. Flores:93 "for Congress to invoke § 5 [of the Fourteenth
Amendment], it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to
remedying or preventing such conduct."94 The Chief Justice held that this
requirement was not met because Congress failed to show a widespread problem
of states violating patents.95 Furthermore, the Court held that even had Congress
shown this, it would have had to show additionally that this deprivation of
property was without due process of law.96 Otherwise, the Fourteenth
Amendment was not being violated. This was not shown either, the Court said,
89 527 U.S. 627 (1999). The reader should take care not to confuse this case with its other
half, discussed in Part I.G.
90 Pub. L. No. 102-560, § 2, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296 (1994)).
91 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636 (referring to Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996)).
92 Id. at 636-37 ("While reaffirming the view that state sovereign immunity does not yield
to Congress' Article I powers, this Court in Seminole Tribe also reaffirmed its holding in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), that Congress retains the authority to abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.").
93 521 U.S. 507,519-20 (1997).
94 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639. See generally Brian Ray, "Out the Window"?
Prospects for the EPA and FMLA after Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 61 OHIO ST. L.J
1755 (2000) (providing, inter alia, a good elaboration of the Boerne "congruence and
proportionality test" for appropriate tailoring of legislative schemes under Section 5).
95Id at 640.
96 Id. at 642-43.
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because Congress "barely considered the availability of state remedies for patent
infringement.' 9 7
The upshot of this holding is that even if states are violating citizens'
Fourteenth Amendment rights, Congress is powerless to subject the states to
citizen suits in federal court for this violation unless it can show a "history of
'widespread and persisting deprivation of " these rights.98 Apparently, citizens
are powerless to protect their federal Fourteenth Amendment rights in federal
court--because Congress is powerless to give the courts jurisdiction to protect
such cifizens--less Congress shows that states' violation of particular
constitutional rights has become ubiquitous. This appears to trust to the states,
rather than the federal government, much of the enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
G. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board
'The State of Florida managed to win yet another increase in state sovereign
immunity against the very same plaintiff on the very same day. In College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Expense Board9 the Court
overruled a thirty-five-year-old precedent and held that there can be no implied
waiver of state sovereign immunity.100
In deciding College Savings, Justice Scalia suggested (but did not clearly
state) that state sovereign immunity may be shredded in only two ways: either by
valid Section 5 enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment or by waiver.
While this immunity to suit is not absolute, we have recognized only two
circumstances in which an individual may sue a State. First Congress may authorize
such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment-an
Amendment enacted after the Eleventh Amendment and specifically designed to alter
the federal-state balance. Second, a State may waive its sovereign immunity by
consenting to suit. 101
97 Id. at 643.
98 Id. at 645 (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)).
99 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
100. at 680 ("We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill-
conceived, and see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it .... Whatever may
remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled?) (overruling Parden v. Terminal R. of
Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)).
101 Id at 670 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Clark v. Bamard, 108
U.S. 436,447-48 (1883)).
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Whereas Florida Prepaid limited the former, College Savings limited the latter
circumstance in which an individual may sue a state. Justice Scalia held that,
generally, the Court "will find a waiver either if the State voluntarily invokes
[federal court] jurisdiction, or else if the State makes a 'clear declaration' that it
intends to submit itself to [federal court] jurisdiction."' 02 Therefore, a state will
not be held to have waived immunity even when it intentionally engages in an
activity that is regulated by Congress, knowing that federal law controls that
activity, and even knowing that Congress purports to subject the state to suit by
individuals for violations of such federal law. After College Savings, states have
absolutely no risk of subjecting themselves to federal jurisdiction over non-
Section 5 suits by individuals, regardless of what activities they engage in. They
will be subject to such suit if and only if they clearly and expressly declare that
they waive their immunity.
H. Alden v. Maine
The final case in this state-sovereign-immunity trio decided on the last day of
the 1998-1999 Term was Alden v. Maine. 103 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority
opinion this time, and the five state-power Justices were unified-that is, there
were no concurring opinions. Alden, the Court said, presented a question of first
impression: "Whether Congress has authority under Article I to abrogate a
State's immunity from suit [for money damages] in its own courts. ' 104 The
Court, of course, answered in the negative, 10 5 but Justice Kennedy first generated
a considerable amount of explanation before even reaching this statement of the
issue's novelty. This preliminary explanation, in part, consisted of a
demonstration of the surprising premise that state sovereign immunity does not
arise from the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, the immunity was held to arise
from the structure of the original, pre-amendment Constitution. After all, as the
dissent pointed out, "the state forum renders the Eleventh Amendment beside the
point,"106 and thus immunity in state court must be found elsewhere.
Several of Justice Kennedy's federalism themes in Alden are familiar from
his opinion in Term Limits. This is so, even though in the latter case he was
joined by the exact opposite group of Justices. In particular, he reasserted the
interpretation of "reserved" (in the Tenth Amendment) that he helped make
102 Id. at 675-76 (citing Gunter v. AtI. Coast Line R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906); and
quoting Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47,54 (1944)).
103 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
104 Id. at 741.
105 Id at 712.
106 Id at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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official in Term Limits, and reemphasized the importance of republicanism and
an equilibrious balance between the state and national governments as
independent sovereigns. 107
State sovereign immunity, he said:
neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment
Rather ... [it] is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed
before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today... except as
altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments. 108
He described states as "residuary sovereigns" 109 that "retain"110 certain aspects
of sovereignty that are "preserved"1 11 by the Constitution. Justice Kennedy thus
unequivocally contradicted Justice Thomas's view, expressed in Justice
Thomas's Term Limits dissent, that the Tenth Amendment affirmatively granted
powers to the states.112 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy was also clear in
asserting that the federal government has no powers that "are not granted to it by
the constitution" either "expressly" or "by necessary implication."1 13
As in Term Limits, Justice Kennedy advocated in favor of independent state
and national republican representative political systems. When Congress
attempts to allow citizens to enforce their federal rights in state courts in suits for
damages, it "asserts authority over [one of] a State's most fundamental political
processes, [and thus] strikes at the heart of the political accountability so
essential to our liberty and republican form of government."1 14 This, wrote
Justice Kennedy, "would blur... the distinct responsibilities of the State and
National Governments." 115 Thus, even though states are required by the
Supremacy Clause to follow federal laws, state courts need not enforce these
laws against their states in favor of citizens claiming damages, because allocation
of states' money among their citizens is purely within the state sphere of power.
10 7 See supra text accompanying notes 33-36 (discussing Justice Kennedy's Term Limits
majority interpretation of "reserved" in the Tenth Amendment),
108 Id. at 713.
10 9 Id at 748.
110 Id. at 713.
111 Id. at 748.
112 See supra Part II.B. It is curious that Justice Thomas declined to write separately to
assert his theory.
113 Alden, 527 U.S. at 739 (quoting Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,
326 (1816)) (internal quotation marks removed).
114 Id at 751.
115 Id.
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I. Kirnel v. Florida Board of Regents
Early in the following term, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,116 the
Court invalidated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)117
insofar as it purported to allow individuals to enforce it against states in federal
court. For a federalism case, Kimel created a superficially unusual division of the
Justices. The bulk of Justice O'Connor's majority opinion 118 was joined by the
other four conservative Justices, but its part III was joined instead by the Chief
Justice and Justices Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.119 Part 111 concluded
that Congress's attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity in enacting the
ADEA was expressed unequivocally.120 The Court has held such unequivocal
expression of intent to be a necessary prerequisite to abrogating Eleventh
Amendment state sovereign immunity by way of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.121 Although Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined part I of
the Kimel majority opinion, they also joined Justice Stevens's dissent,122 which
argued that neither the Eleventh Amendment nor the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity limits Congress's power to allow enforcement of valid federal
statutory obligations-including, he believed, the ADEA-against states by
private citizens.123 Consequently, these three liberal Justices' concurrence with
Justice O'Connor's part III was not especially material to their views of
constitutional federalism, nor did it indicate a breakdown of the five-four
federalism split on the Court.
More relevant to the theoretical disunity in the state-power wing, Justices
Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented from part n1.124 In effect, his
dissent argued for a more unequivocally unequivocal congressional expression of
intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. He believed in a higher threshold for
this "unmistakably clear expression" requirement,125 one that even Justices
O'Connor and Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist would not require. On the
other hand, although Justices Thomas and Kennedy want it to be especially
116 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
117 Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-23 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 623 (Supp. m 1997)).
1 18 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66-73,78-92.
119 1d at 73-78.
120 Id. at 78.
121 See Astascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
12 2 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 92-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
123 Id at 93 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
124 Id. at 99-109 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125 Id. at 105 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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burdensome for Congress to accomplish an unequivocal expression of intent to
abrogate sovereign immunity, they agreed with the other conservative Justices
that, even had the ADEA satisfied this requirement, it would still be an
illegitimate attempt to use Section 5.
Justice O'Connor reasserted Seminole Tribe's holding that, even though the
Commerce Clause may give Congress sole authority to regulate interstate
commerce, that clause does not allow Congress to enforce such regulation by
allowing private suits against states in federal courts.126 Thus, paradoxically,
power to regulate does not necessarily carry with it power to provide for
enforcement. As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, it is hard to see how such
an unenforceable power to regulate is a power at all. 127
Justice O'Connor expressed distinct frustration with Justice Stevens's
dissent: "the present dissenters' refusal to accept the validity and natural import
of decisions like Hans, rendered over a full century ago by this Court, makes it
difficult to engage in additional meaningful debate on the place of state sovereign
immunity in the Constitution." 128 The remainder of her opinion asserted'the
majority's position that the ADEA does not address Fourteenth Amendment
rights and thus does not fall within the Section 5 power of enforcement.
J. United States v. Morrison
Later that term, in United States v. Morrison,129 the Court struck down the
federal Violence Against Women Act as an invalid congressional attempt to use
its Commerce Power. As in the typical federalism case, the Court split five-four
with disagreement among the five conservative Justices as to what justified their
decision. On the other hand, although this case would seem to be a mere
reiteration of Lopez, there was no separate opinion by Justice O'Connor
emphasizing her agreement with the non-federalism-related policies behind the
statute.130 One might have expected such an opinion, based on her reputation as
a conservative Justice who nevertheless is an advocate of women's issues. What
was similar to Lopez was the separate opinion of Justice Thomas, concurring, but
arguing as usual that the Court's "substantial effects" test for determining the
scope of the commerce power in fact results in that power being virtually
limitless:
126 Id. at 80.
127 Id at 97 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
128 Id. at 79-80 (referring to Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
129 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
130 See infra Part III.D (discussing Justice O'Connor's tendencies in federalism cases).
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The very notion of a "substantial effects" test under the Commerce Clause is
inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress' powers and with this
Court's early Commerce Clause cases. By continuing to apply this rootless and
malleable standard, however circumscribed, the Court has encouraged the Federal
Government to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits.131
Justice Thomas, therefore, continues to want to undo most of the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the last couple of centuries.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, however, unequivocally
distanced the rest of the state-power Justices from Justice Thomas's extreme
view: "As we discussed at length in Lopez, our interpretation of the Commerce
Clause has changed as our nation has developed. ' 132 Given that Justice
Thomas's only goal in writing separately was to express dismay at the Court's
historically broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the conservative
majority's explicit acceptance of a relatively broad interpretation of the
Commerce Clause again illustrated the significant rift between Justice Thomas
and the rest of his conservative colleagues.
K. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett
In the following term the Court returned again to state sovereign immunity,
this time with respect to Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA).133 In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett134 the
usual five-member majority held that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits
individual state employees from suing unconsenting states under Title I for
money damages.135 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the principal opinion, and
Justice Kennedy wrote a brief concurring opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor.
For the first time, Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized the state-power
majority as having "extended the [Eleventh] Amendment's applicability to suits
by citizens against their own States. 136 This is a refreshingly candid admission
of the Court's activist disagreement with the actual language of the Eleventh
Amendment. The former story was that, although the Amendment's language
does not say what the majority says it means, they "underst[and] the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
131 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 607.
133 42 U.S.C. §§ 1211-12117 (1994).
134 121 S. Ct 955 (2001).
135 Id. at 960.
136 Id. at 962 (emphasis added).
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presupposition... which it confirms." 137 Now the state-power majority has
conceded that, on the contrary, it has judicially "extended" the Eleventh
Amendment.
Garrett's most significant enhancement of state power is its raising of
the bar for Section 5's required congressional showing of "a history and
pattern of unconstitutional" conduct.1 38 Although Congress made the ADA
enforceable against states only after "compil[ing] a vast legislative record
documenting massive society-wide discrimination against persons with
disabilities," 139 the majority found that this record "simply fails to show that
Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in
employment against the disabled." 140 In fact, the majority set a nearly
impossible Section 5 hurdle for Congress by describing as the paradigm the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.141 This is a nearly impossible hurdle because,
with the benefit of thirty-five years of hindsight, nothing could be more
obvious today than that there was a problem of state-endorsed racial
discrimination in voting in 1965. One need not look at the congressional
findings; the fact of racial discrimination in the 1960s is prominent in the
national conscience. To hold Congress to such a high standard is virtually to
strip Congress of its Section 5 power. In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist
suggests such an accomplishment by describing Congress's power as one to
determine "desirable public policy," as if to say that Congress may declare
only what it wishes the law to be.142
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, wrote a concurring
opinion expressing rather strong favor for the policy behind the ADA: "I do
not doubt that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 will be a
milestone on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society. '143
Apparently, however, his reason for nevertheless holding it inapplicable to
state employers was that states do not discriminate-people do. It is wrong,
he argued, "to say that the States in their official capacities, the States as
governmental entities, must be held in violation of the Constitution on the
assumption that they embody the misconceived or malicious perceptions of
137 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, at 54 (1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
138 Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964.
139 Id. at 969 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 965; see also Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism, and a Court with
an Eccentric Mission, 62 OHIO ST. L.J 31, 105-07 (2001).
141 Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 967.
142 Id. at 967 (emphasis added).
143 Id at 968 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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some of their citizens." 144 One wonders whether Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor would apply this same argument to corporations. On the other
hand, they do emphasize that Congress "can compel the States to act," 145
using language that may seem strong to some of their state-power colleagues.
Although Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion is brief, it is long on
support for the ADA's goals and suggestion that such goals are based on real
problems. In this way, it distinguishes itself from the principal opinion and
further demonstrates the continuing rifts between the members of the state-
power quintet with respect to federalism.
Ill. THE UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHIES OF FEDERALISM
This section will seek each Justice's personal theory of federalism. It will do
so for each Justice by looking primarily at opinions written by that Justice but
also by noting which other opinions that Justice joined or did not join. As a
result, it will quickly become apparent just how divergent the various state-power
Justices' theories of federalism are. Nevertheless, even where their theories are
inconsistent with each other, they usually converge at least on the results
increasing state power. As the investigation in this section ought to make clear,
the state-power quintet that has been making so much federalism law recently is
not thereby generating a coherent theory of federalisn. For the most part, what
they are generating is a heated argument taking place in concurring opinions,
while the states get their result of increased power, one case at a time.
A. ChiefJustice Rehnquist
Chief Justice Rehnquist's style of legal reasoning makes it difficult to extract
his general theory of federalism from the opinions he writes. His style involves
reasoning that stays very close to the facts of the case at hand and draws its
patterns of inference almost exclusively from the language of previous cases.
Whereas some of the other Justices make broad statements about history, original
intent, and constitutional structure (all of which illuminate that Justice's more
general theoretical stance), the Chief Justice tends to refrain from this. As a
result, an extraction of his more general theoretical stance must remain more
speculative than that of the others. On the other hand, it can be revealing to look
at the concurring opinions of the other state-power Justices that the Chief Justice
has declined to join.146 Equally revealing is the one opinion, written by Justice
144Id
145 Id at 969 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935-36 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
id. at 936-39 (Thomas, J., concurring); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,288-297
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Kennedy, that the Chief Justice signed alone.147 These concurring opinions are
revealing because they embody disagreements between the Chief Justice and
other Justices, and they generally contain broader theoretical assertions about
federalism. One can thus attempt to learn what the Chief Justice believes by
learning what he does not believe.
Because the Chief Justice's opinion in Lopez was signed by the entire state-
power wing of the Court, it is of limited value as evidence of his personal general
theory of federalism. However, it is worth looking at for this purpose because
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas all expressed reservations with respect
to it in concurring opinions. In his opinion, the Chief Justice tended to make his
broader claims by way of quotation. For example, he quoted James Madison
from the Federalist: "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite." 148 To some extent, this assertion
expresses the point of departure for the entire state-power wing of the Court.
That is, the national government, as an entity created by the Constitution, can
have powers only by virtue of the text of the Constitution, and, as a corollary,
state powers are limited only by the text of the Constitution. This conception of
constitutional federalism is certainly the view of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia,149 and Justice Thomas.150 As discussed more thoroughly below, Justice
O'Connor1 51 and especially Justice Kennedy1 52 are wary of this interpretation of
the Constitution's allocation of power between states and the national
government. In fact, although Justice Kennedy generally signs others' opinions
advocating this theory, his own opinions suggest a notion of constitutional
federalism that is at odds with this theory, one whereby the Constitution allocates
power to the states and the national government on more of an equal basis.153
In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist also quoted Chief Justice Hughes's
majority opinion in Jones & Laughlin Steel. Rehnquist decided to limit the
(1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838-845
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568-83 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring).
147 Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 270-80 (Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of
the Court, but the Chief Justice joined only with respect to parts 1I.B, ll.C, and I.D of the
opinion).
14 8 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
14 9 See infra Part fI.C.
150 See infra Part II.E.
151 See infra Part IH.D.
152 See infra Part III.B.
153 See id.
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national government's Commerce Clause power in Lopez, he said, because it had
to have some limit. Else, "the scope of the interstate commerce power... 'would
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local
and create a completely centralized government.' ' 154 This reasoning may seem
arbitrary, but the disagreement shown in the concurring opinions suggests that
Chief Justice Rehnquist's drawing of the Commerce Clause line at this case may
simply have been a compromise designed to gamer a majority of signatures.
For example, in their concurring opinion, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
did not seem worried by Chief Justice Rehnquist's slippery slope argument that,
if the Commerce Clause does not stop at the Lopez facts, it may not stop
anywhere. Instead, they argued that the political process, rather than the Court,
should generally determine the appropriate balance of powers between the state
and national governments. 155 They argued that Lopez was merely a case where
"one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far," thus
justifying the Court's intervention to tip them back.156
In contrast to both Justice Kennedy's concurrence and Chief Justice
Rehnquist's principal opinion, Justice Thomas believes that the Court was
already at the bottom of the slippery slope. That is, he believes that the Court's
usual articulation of the scope of the commerce power-the "substantial effects"
test--"appears to grant Congress a police power over the Nation." 157 Justice
Thomas thus is happy that the Court has stopped the national government's
power under the Commerce Clause somewhere, but he believes that the Court
should go much further in limiting this power. Ie does not want the Court to
leave the federal balance to the political process; instead, he wants the Court to
confine the national government's commerce power to the text of the Commerce
Clause.158
The Commerce Clause and constitutional federalism interpretations of
Justice Thomas, on the one hand, and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, on the
other, are thus apparently irreconcilable in theory. Justice Thomas believes that
the Court should be strict in striking down all federal legislation that does not fit
his narrow reading of the Commerce Clause. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
154 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (quoting NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 25, at 2225-26.
15 5 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Our role in preserving the federal
balance seems more tenuous.").
156 Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157 Id. at 600 (Thomas, J. concurring).
158 Of course, the Commerce Clause ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate
Commerce... among the several States ... ') is as ambiguous as any clause in the
Constitution, and therefore it is not very helpful to say it should be limited to its text. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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believe that the Court should be reluctant to interfere in what they view as more
appropriately a political battle. They believe that the state and national
governments should usually be allowed to come to a balance of power through
the political process set up by the Constitution. The Court need interfere only
when one side's "intrusion" upon the other's proper sphere of power is
"significant."159
Yet, despite the irreconcilability of these theories, all of these Justices signed
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Lopez. This seems to be the key to understanding
what is behind Justice Rehnquist's opinion: it is a compromise. It is not a
compromise of each Justice's theories of constitutional federalism and the
Commerce Clause. Rather, the five state-power Justices sacrificed offering any
useful theory behind their holding so that they could come to a specific result
with which they all agreed: that the Gun Free School Zones Act was outside of
the national government's sphere of power. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion reached this result without offending the theories of any of the
concurring Jutices, but the only way it could do this was by being devoid of any
useful theoretical backing itself. His Lopez opinion therefore reveals little if
anything of his own theory of federalism. On the other hand it is an excellent
illuitration of the fact that the Court is making federalist law without a unified
federalist idea.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Seminole Tribe, also, is of limited
usefulness for the present investigation. Like most of the Court's state sovereign
immunity decisions, it totally unified the state-power wing of the Court.160
Because of this unity, without even any concurring opinions expressing
reservations, the opinion did not reveal the disunity in federalism theory that
many of the other cases do. What it did show (especially in conjunction with
Alden, College Savings, and Florida Prepaid) was that, although the state-power
Justices have highly divergent theories of federalism in general, they all agree for
the most part that the national government's power to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity from citizen suits is severely limited. 161
Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Eleventh Amendment "stands for," and
"confirms," the "presupposition... that each State is a sovereign entity in our
159 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, ., concurring).
160 Compare Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), with Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 (1999), Coll. Says. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999), and Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
1 161 Note that, in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, this unity breaks down with respect to Ex parte
Young jurisdiction, as discussed supra Part lI.D. Coeur d'Alene Tribe is unusual in that it
reveals a division between Chief Justice Rehnquist's federalism and that of Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas.
1270 [Vol. 62:1243
FIVE FACES OF FEDERALISM
federal system." 162 This may be a bit of an overstatement, tempered by his
subsequent assertion that states "'maintain certain attributes of sovereignty,
including sovereign immunity.' 163 Thus, although the state-power Justices like
to emphasize the sovereign aspects of states, description of them as "sovereigns"
or "sovereign entities" may be somewhat of a rhetorical overstatement. Everyone
knows that states are not sovereigns in the same sense that the United States or
China are sovereigns. They once were (according to official Supreme Court
history), but they cashed in certain aspects of that sovereignty in exchange for
unity under the Constitution with the other states.
As Lopez revealed, there is no majority view on the Court on how exactly the
Constitution deals with reallocating sovereign powers between the state and
national governments. However, the state-power majority does agree that "the
Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding federal power at the expense of state
autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power
struck by the Constitution,"1 64 (whatever that balance was). That is, the
Fourteenth Amendment gave the national government increased powers both
over, and relative to, the states. And it even gave the national government the
power to abrogate, in some limited circumstances, the states' sovereign immunity
from citizen suit. According to the Court, the national government cannot
abrogate this immunity except "pursuant to a constitutional provision granting
Congress the power" to do so. 165 This statement is very much in line with the
principle that the national government has only the limited, specific, enumerated
powers given it by the constitution. Thus, in Seminole Tribe, as in Lopez, Chief
Justice Rehnquist emphasizes this view.
The Chief Justice's own view is shown to diverge from those of some of the
other state-power Justices in Coeur d'Alene Tribe. In particular, he is the only
other Justice to join the non-majority sections of Justice Kennedy's principal
opinion. These minority sections of Kennedy's opinion argue that the state courts
should be on a more equal footing with the federal courts in interpreting federal
law. "Interpretation of federal law is the proprietary concern of state, as well as
162 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (internal quotation marks omitted). More accurately,
the Court says that this is one "part" of the presupposition, the other part of which is that "'[i]t
is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without
its consent."' Id (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (quoting THE FEDERALisT
No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961))).
163 Id. (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
146 (1993)).
164 Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,455 (1976)).
165 Id. at 59. As Alden, College Savings, and Florida Prepaid reveal, Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is now the only provision granting Congress this power. See supra
parts 11.H, ll.G, and II.F.
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federal, courts." 166 Thus, in this case, Justice Kennedy argues, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist, that the Court should apply "a careful balancing and accommodation
of state interests when determining whether the Young exception applies in a
given case." 167
Their notion of constitutional federalism is that the state and national
governments (including their courts) are to be equals. Although federal law is
supreme under the Supremacy Clause, the state courts have no less of an
obligation and ability than do the federal courts to uphold and interpret federal
law. "A doctrine based on the inherent inadequacy of state forums would run
counter to basic principles of federalism" 168 Not surprisingly, because this is
Justice Kennedy's opinion, this view is consistent with Justice Kennedy's views
as expressed in the other cases.169 What is interesting is that Chief Justice
Rehnquist chose to join Justice Kennedy in the latter's application of this
federalist philosophy to this case.
As seen above, the Chief Justice's general theory of federalism is
extraordinarily difficult to glean from his own opinions. In Lopez, this was
because his opinion was a vehicle for the state-power wing of the Court to come
together and agree on a result where their underlying theoretical bases differed
greatly. In Seminole Tribe and Florida Prepaid, his federalist theory is not
distinguished from those of the other state-power Justices, because, in each of
those cases, he was writing for the entire state-power quintet without any
separate concurrences filed. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, then, seems to align Chief
Justice Rehnquist with Justice Kennedy against the other three state-power
Justices on federalist theory. However, this apparently cannot be the case, for the
Chief Justice declined to join Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez.
The crucial place to find hints of the Chief Justice's federalist theory thus seems
to be in the differences between Justice Kennedy's concurring opinions in Coeur
d'Alene Tribe and Lopez. Indeed, important differences there ought to be, for
Justice O'Connor takes the reverse approach to the Chief Justice, joining Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Lopez where the Chief Justice does not, and not joining
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Coeur d'Alene Tribe where the Chief Justice does
join.
166 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,275 (1997).
167 id. at 278.
16 8 Id. at 275.
169 See infra Part III.B. Justice Kennedy's federalist theory is centered around the idea of
a serious equality between state and federal governments, with some broadly equilibrious
balance in power being the constitutional mandate. He disfavors interference by federal courts
into what he sees as the appropriately political-and not judicial-battle for power between
state and national governments.
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Unfortunately, in the end, contrasting these two opinions by Justice Kennedy
will disappoint anyone seeking Chief Justice Rehnquist's general theory of
federalism. The Chief Justice's principal opinion in Lopez is a philosophically
neutral compromise between members of a philosophically splintered majority.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion (joined by Justice O'Connor) expresses
strong reservations with the principal opinion, barely agreeing with it at all. The
Chief Justice, having authored the principal opinion with which Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion disagreed, was therefore in no position to join
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, even if he did agree with its theoretical
basis. In Coeur d'Alene Tribe, on the other hand, Justice Kennedy's opinion was
the principal opinion, and the Chief Justice was thus in a position to join as much
or as little of it as he pleased.
On the other hand, there are some substantive differences between these
opinions of Justice Kennedy, differences that do reveal subtle divergence of his
theory from Chief Justice Rehnquist's. Lopez was about the Commerce Clause
power of Congress to regulate activity within states. Justice Kennedy disagreed
with the principal opinion's emphasis on stemming the tide of congressional
power relative to state power. That is, whereas Justice Kennedy's approach is to
make the Court a neutral referee that keeps an eye out for either national or state
governments gaining too much power through the political process, the Chief
Justice's principal opinion seems to focus only on stopping, or even reducing,
national power. Thus, when it comes to congressional power, at least, the Chief
Justice is happy to play a part in dictating the proper constitutional limit on
national power. Justice Kennedy would prefer the Court to stay out of the game
until one or the other goes too far.
Contrast this with Coeur d'Alene Tribe. In this case, the issue was the federal
courts' power over state governments with respect to citizens' suits against states.
Here, Justice Kennedy still wanted the federal courts to stay out of what he saw
as a properly political battle to find an equilibrious balance of state versus
national power. Chief Justice Rehnquist thinks this is a fine theory here, where
the Court would be going against a state rather than against Congress. He is quite
willing to have the Court step in to oppose congressional power, but less willing
to have the Court step in to enforce citizens' federal rights against states.
Therefore, in the contrast between these two concurring opinions of Justice
Kennedy, a glimmer of the Chief Justice's theory of federalism appears. At the
very least this contrast shows where the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy
diverge in their theories. There is evidence in Coeur d'Alene Tribe that the Chief
Justice agrees to some extent with Justice Kennedy's vision of state and national
governments as politically dueling equals, roughly balanced in an equilibrium of
power due to their separate accountability to their citizens. However, the
agreement goes only so far. The Chief Justice does not adhere to this theory
when the Court is positioned against congressional power rather than against
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state power. He is willing to have the Court actively control congressional power
where Justice Kennedy cautions a more neutral and passive approach. He wants
the Court to back off where states are defendants against citizens and the state
courts could in theory handle the case.
Examining these cases thus leaves us with a picture of Chief Justice
Rehnquist as a rather one-directional defender of state power against
encroachment of national power.170 He agrees with Justice Kennedy's theory of
a passive Court in federalism issues, but only insofar as that theory supports the
Court limiting or reducing its own power (as a part of the national government)
over states and relative to state courts. Where that theory dictates that the Court
refrain from opposing congressional power, the Chief Justice abandons it
Indeed, this picture of the Chief Justice's federalism comports as well with his
support in Lopez and Seminole Tribe of the idea that "[t]he powers delegated by
the ... Constitution to the federal government are few and defined[, and] ...
[t]hose which... remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite." 171
B. Justice Kennedy
In contrast to the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy is always forthcoming with
his theoretical bases for his federalism opinions. Where some of the other state-
power Justices emphasize limits on national power,172 Justice Kennedy tends
rather to emphasize the benefits of "the tension between federal and state
power."173 Where these other Justices are comfortable with the Court dictating
the boundaries between national and state power,174 Justice Kennedy tends to
advocate a passive Court except where extreme imbalances between state and
national power arise: "Our role in preserving the federal balance seems more
tenuous." 175
170 Professor Sullivan characterizes him as favoring a "one way ratchet, invalidating a
federal encroachment upon the states but not a state encroachment upon the federal
government." Sullivan, supra note 45, at 103.
171 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,552 (1995) (quoting TEFEDERAUSTNO. 45, at
292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
172 Particularly, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. See supra part
ILA, and infra parts m.C & M.E.
173 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Justice O'Connor's
principal opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458-59 (1991)).
174 For example, see Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas in Lopez;
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas in Coeur d'Alene Tribe; and Justice Thomas in Printz.
175 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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More generally, though, Justice Kennedy's federalist theory is grounded in
the notion of the national and state governments being separate republican
governments, each independently accountable to its citizens. He emphasizes the
view that the Constitution "establish[ed] two orders of government, each with its
own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.' 17 6 The tension
arising from this dual representative capacity of the government is the
appropriate source of allocation of power between the state and national
governments, according to Justice Kennedy. That is, the political process, and
not the courts, should usually determine the boundaries of the spheres of federal
and state power.
In fact, Justice Kennedy's ideal of a federal court that is relatively passive on
federalist matters diverges from all of the other Justices' federalist ideals, though
not all in the same case. In Lopez, only Justice O'Connor agrees with his desire
to generally keep the Court out of the business of delineating the limits of
Congress's Commerce Clause power.177 On the other hand, in Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, only Chief Justice Rehnquist agrees with Justice Kennedy's desire to leave
more Ex parte Young cases up to state-rather than federal-courts to
determine.178
Another distinguishing characteristic of Justice Kennedy's theory is his
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment Here, his theory diverged so sharply
from those of the other state-power Justices that it aligned him with the usual
dissenters in Term Limits. Ironically, this resulted in his interpretation of the
Tenth Amendment becoming law. That is, Term Limits made official his theory
that the Tenth Amendment "reserved" to the states only those powers that were
in the states prior to unification, less the powers that the Constitution gives to the
national government. By this theory, the Tenth Amendment does not give the
states any powers that exist only because of unification under the Constitution.179
Justice Kennedy reinforced this interpretation's status as law in his opinion in
Alden. In that opinion, he referred to the states as "residuary sovereigns," arguing
that the states have sovereign immunity because the Constitution "preserved" this
aspect of sovereignty in the states.180 This stance puts Justice Kennedy in stark
176 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
177 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
178 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tnbe, 521 U.S. 261, 270-80 (1997).
179 Therefore, as explained above, Term Limits held that the states have no power under
the Tenth Amendment to place qualifications on congressional candidates, because the power
to impose such qualifications exists only as a result of unification under the Constitution. See
supra Part lI.B.
180 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,748 (1999).
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opposition to Justice Thomas's view as expressed in his Term Limits dissent.1 81
There, Justice Thomas argued that the Tenth Amendment powers of the states
are not limited to the residual powers that were in them prior to unification, but
that the Amendment affirmatively gives the states any powers that the
Constitution does not explicitly (or by "necessary implication") give to the
national government. This is a major and fundamental disagreement among the
state-power Justices on constitutional federalismr. And yet these Justices
repeatedly come together to make fedealist law.
Finally, Justice Kennedy distinguishes himself from most of the other
Justices in his focus on the "dignity and respect 1 82 that he sees inhering in
states' sovereignty. In particular,'It is in this rather abstract notion of sovereign
"dignity" that he finds the states' sovereign immunity. 183 However, he is clear
that this sovereign "dignity" goes only so far in determining federalism issues.
The states, he concedes, "retainothe dignity, though not the full authority, of
sovereignty;" and Congress "can compel the States to act."184 In maling these
statements, Justice Kennedy shovs a greater willingness than the other state-
power Justices toward admitting limits on state power.
Most fundamentally, therefore, Justice Kennedy's theory of federalism
differs from those of the other state-power Justices in (1) the central role it gives
to the Constitution's dual-republican system of government (2) the severely
limited role it gives the federal courts in determining the allocation of power
between the state and national governments, and (3) its emphasis on not only
limits on national power, but limits on state power as well.1 85 These are not
superficial differences in federalist theory; they are fundamental. These
181 In fact, Kennedy may be in disagreement with all of the other state-power Justices on
this matter due to the fact that they joined Justice Thomas's Term Limits dissent and failed to
write dissents of their own. See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 845-926 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see
also supra part I3.
182 Coeurd'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 268.
183 "The principle of sovereign immunity preserved by constitutional design 'thus accords
the States the respect owed them as members of the federation."' Alden, 527 U.S. at 748-49
(quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)).
"Congress must accord States the esteem due to them as joint participants in a federal system,
one beginning with the premise of sovereignty in both the central Government and the separate
States." Id. at 758.
184 Id. at 715; Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, at 969 (Kennedy,
J., Concurring).
185 
"Justice Kennedy alone sees the Court's role in federalism disputes as a two-way
ratchet, stopping the states from 'invad[ing] the sphere of federal sovereignty' but also holding
the federal government 'within the boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon matters
reserved to the States."' Sullivan, supra note 16, at 103 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thomton, 514 U.S. 779, 841 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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fundamental differences in the theoretical bases behind the state-power Justices'
state-power votes on federalism decisions make the impact of the decisions
puzzling. For if one looks hard enough in seeking the federalism theory behind
these decisions for guidance, one will not find a theory agreed upon by all the
voting Justices. This fact is shown by examining the theories of the Chief Justice
and Justice Kennedy alone. It is shown even further by attempting to extract the
theories on which Justices Scalia,186 O'Connor,187 and Thomas188 base their
votes.
C. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia's federalism theory is as difficult to extract as Chief Justice
Rehnquist's. Justice Scalia wrote two of the principal opinions for the cases
examined in this note, but he wrote no concurring opinions expressing his
disagreement with the other Justices' principal opinions. He did, however,
indicate a disagreement with Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist by not
joining the former's minority opinion section! in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, and by
signing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. However, this was the only time
Justice Scalia signed a non-principal opinion by a state-power Justice.
Justice Scalia is well known for his textualism and originalismi.189 In fact, in
Printz, he made clear that the reason he went beyond the text in deciding the case
was that "there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise question." 190
However, notwithstanding his impassioned advocacy of objective, formalistic
judicial decision-making, Justice Scalia is not universally viewed as practicing
what he preaches. As a cynical speculation, this may explain the lack of a
discoverable theoretical basis behind his federalism votes. That is, perhaps he is
interested only in the results that favor state power. Indeed, this could explain as
well the difficulty in extracting any theory behind Chief Justice Rehnquist's
federalism votes.
On the other hand, there is an equally plausible and more generous
explanation. Namely, Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist may just fall
between the other disagreeing state-power Justices on most issues of federalism.
Hence, they tend not to join the concurring opinions of the other three state-
186 See infra Part m.C.
187 See infra Part IIlD.
18 8 See infra Part ff.E.
189 See M. David Gelfand & Kieth Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on a
"Conservative" Court: Currents and Cross-Currents from Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64
TuL L. REV. 1443, 1443 (1990) (arguing that Justice Scalia's approach to federalism is partly
explained by his "decided preference for a more formalistic, rule-bound methodology").
190 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
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power Justices, resting relatively content with the compromise reached in the
principal opinions. Regardless of which explanation of Justice Scalia's
federalism voting is accurate, there are nevertheless some indications of his
personal theory of federalism.
First and perhaps most obvious, is Justice Scalia's sole disagreement with
Chief Justice Rehnquist, namely in Coeur d'Alene. Recall that although Justice
Kennedy wrote the official principal opinion in that case, parts of it were joined
only by the Chief Justice. Justice Scalia instead joined Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion, which expressed disagreement with the principal opinion.
This disagreement is summarized as follows:
When a plaintiff seeks prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal rights,
ordinarily the Eleventh Amendment poses no bar. Yet the principal opinion
unnecessarily questions this basic principle of federal law.. . .There is no need to call
into question the importance of having federal courts interpret federal rights--
particularly as a means of serving a federal interest in uniformity-to decide this
case.
191
Thus, although the Chief Justice came down in each case in favor of the
result of increased state power, this was not true of Justice Scalia. He, along with
Justices O'Connor and Thomas, was unwilling to narrow the Ex parte Young
doctrine so as to be limited by a case-by-case consideration of state interests and
the importance of the federal right at stake. They view the availability ofExparte
Young jurisdiction as an important limit on how far they will go toward
increasing or shielding state power. The strength of the disagreement is
emphasized by the fact that normally, when it comes to Eleventh Amendment
state sovereign immunity from suit the five state-power Justices are in unison in
favor of immunity.192 Justice Scalia and the other two stop, though, when it
comes to an individual's ability to get purely prospective relief in federal court
from a state official's violation of federal rights. Only Justice Kennedy and the
Chief Justice are willing to limit this ability, and this is the only difference in
voting between Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice.
Additionally, in his College Savings principal opinion, Justice Scalia makes
some claims against legislative flexibility that are opposed to opinions expressed
by some of the other state-power Justices:
191 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 293 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(internal citation omitted).
192 See Bd. of Trs. ofthe Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001), Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 710 (1999), Coll. Says. Bank v.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 667 (1999), Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Says. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,629 (1999).
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171o say that the degree of dispersal [of governmental power] to the States, and hence
the degree of check by the States, is to be governed by Congress's need for
'legislative flexibility" is to deny federalism utterly ... Legislative flexibility on the
part of Congress will be the touchstone of federalism when the capacity to support
combustion becomes the acid test of a fire extinguisher. Congressional flexibility is
desirable, of course-but only within the bounds offederal power established by the
Constitution. Beyond those bounds (the theory of our Constitution goes), it is a
menace.
193
In contrast to this, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, in the former's concurring
Lopez opinion, expressed their support for the need for such flexibility:
In referring to the whole subject of the federal and state balance, we said this just three
Terms ago:
This framework has been sufficiently flexible over the past two centuries to
allow for enormous changes in the nature of government ... [T]he powers
conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in
language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government's
role.194
Therefore, Justice Scalia's theory that legislative flexibility is generally opposed
to constitutional federalism is at odds with Justice Kennedy and Justice
O'Connor's theory. Although Justice Scalia claimed that the Constitution's
federalism opposes legislative flexibility, in truth it is Justice Scalia's textualism
that opposes legislative flexibility.195 Nothing in the Constitution sets out an
exhaustively specific description of a rigid federalist structure. Rather, the
Constitution's federalism-like most other aspects of the Constitution-is vague,
general, and not fixed to any particular historical period of the nation's
development.' 96 The point to be seen in this criticism for present purposes is that
this theoretical disagreement about federalism and legislative flexibility between
Justice Scalia and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor is, in all likelihood, actually a
disagreement about textualism and legislative flexibility; it just happens to be in
the context of federalism here.
193 College Savings Bank; 527 U.S. at 690.
194 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574-75 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992)).
195 See Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 189, at 1459-60.
196 As Professor Merritt aptly put it, "Much of our Constitution is written with abstract,
timeless words. The phrase 'Commerce among the several States' is not the same as
'Commerce among the several states that was technologically feasible in 1787."' Merritt, supra
note 5, at 1207.
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Therefore, Justice Scalia's theory of federalism is at least as obscure as
Justice Rebnquist's.197 There is very little discernible theoretical basis behind his
opinions and his votes in federalism cases. In fact, more than one commentator
has pointed out that Printz (his only opinion in these cases with which any state-
power Justice expressed reservations) was based on nothing more than citation to
New York v. United States.198 Perhaps the only significant conclusion that can be
drawn about Justice Scalia's federalism theory is the cynical one that, like Chief
Justice Rehnquist, he has no theoretical basis for his federalism decisions beyond
the desire to see results in favor of state power. But this is a speculative
proposition given the unrevealing nature of his opinions. Unlike the Chief
Justice, however, Justice Scalia has indicated limits to this desire: he believes
that a state, under the name of a state officer, ought to be susceptible to suit in
federal court by an individual for purely prospective relief from the officer's
violation of the individual's federal rights.
D. Justice O'Connor
Commentators have speculated that Justice O'Connor's strong background
in state politics has made her a staunch defender of state autonomy on the
Supreme Court.199 True as this may be, the cases considered in this note reveal
her to be a relative moderate among the state-power Justices on this issue. She
has never signed Justice Thomas's extreme concurring opinions in favor of state
power.200 She wrote the Coeur d'Alene Tribe concurring opinion20 1 that
protected Ex parte Young jurisdiction against the attack waged by Justice
Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnqust.20 2 Finally, she respectively wrote and
197 See Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 189, at 1449 ("Justice Scalia's judicial opinions
on key federalism issues generally have been brief, almost cryptic:).
198 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 5, at 2192 ("Although he is usually a constitutional
originalist, Justice Scalia's discussion of text, history, and structure is largely defensive and at
best inconclusive. Justice Scalia treated the Court's own decisions, of more recent vintage, as
most dispositive. The majority relied essentially on the evidence of New York [v. United
States].").
199 See Richard A. Cordray & James T. Vradelis, Comment, The Emerging
Jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 389, 423-36 (1985); Gelfand &
Werhan, supra note 189, at 1449-56.
200 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936-39 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
201 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,288-297 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
202 See id. at 270-80.
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signed concurring opinions in Print203 and Lopez204 that urged moderation
against eroding national power.
In Coeur d'Alene Tribe, Justice O'Connor's opinion was that Ex parte
Young jurisdiction was unavailable to the plaintiff because the action, though
formally pleaded as an Ex parte Young action, was in fact the functional
equivalent of a non Ex parte Young action. That is, in substance the action was
directly against the state; only through cmfty pleading was it formally against a
state officer. Justice Kennedy wanted to go further than this and limit the
availability of Ex parte Young jurisdiction by a case-by-case consideration of
"whether a state forum is available to hear the dispute, what particular federal
right the suit implicates, and whether 'special factors counsel] hesitation' in the
exercise ofjurisdiction." 20 5 Justice O'Connor was unwilling to further limit the
Young doctrine in this way.206 As much as she may be a defender of state
autonomy, she would not go as far as Justice Kennedy and the Chief Justice in
limiting an individual's ability to get Exparte Young protection of federal rights
in federal court against state officials. 20 7
In a very brief concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor urged relative
moderation in Printz as we. 208 It appears that although she agreed with the
holding that Congress cannot directly commandeer state and local officers to
carry out federal laws, Justice O'Connor nevertheless favored the policy behind
the Brady Act. She was quick to clarify that the "holding, of course, does not
spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act."209 She even suggested that
Congress would be able constitutionally to make the commandeering provisions
indirect through conditional federal spending rather than direct 210 Justice
203 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
204 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
205 Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in
original) (quoting Part ll.D of Justice Kennedy's opinion, joined by only Chief Justice
Rehnquist (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388,396 (1971))).
206 As Justice O'Connor wrote, "I would not narrow our Young doctrine, but I would not
extend it to reach this case." Iat at 296-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
207 "There is no need to call into question the importance of having federal courts
interpret federal rights-particularly as a means of serving a federal interest in uniformity-to
decide this case" Id. at 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It is especially interesting that Justices
Scalia and Thomas join her in this relatively moderate view in favor ofnational power.
208 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935-36 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
209 Id at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
210 "Congress is also free to amend the interim program to provide for its continuance on




Scalia's principal opinion obliquely indicated disagreement with this
suggestion.211
Finally, Justice O'Connor was the sole Justice to join Justice Kennedy's
relatively moderate concurring opinion in Lopez.2 12 As discussed above, they
barely agreed with the principal opinion's limitation of the commerce power.213
They expressed discomfort with the Court's apparent eagerness to take on the
task of defining the boundaries between state and national power. In their
opinion, these boundaries ought rather to be defined by way of the political
process. The federal courts need to step in only in case "one or the other level of
Government has tipped the scales too far."214 Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
further believe there is a need for divergence from the original intent or
understanding of the broad language of the Commerce Clause, based on the
drastically changed economic structure of the nation and states since the clause's
drafing.215 This belief puts them in disagreement with at least Justices Scalia216
and Thomas, 217 who tend to be strict originalists.
Therefore, contrary to expectations that Justice O'Connor's background in
state politics would lead her to be a staunch defender of state autonomy, she has
tufined out to be relatively moderate in this regard. At least relative to the
company she keeps (on the state-power wing of the Court), she appears to be
moderate. Where this is the case, the state-power wing can go only as far as
Justice O'Connor will go in favor of state autonomy. Her concurring opinions in
Printz and Coeur d'Alene Tribe, as well as her joining Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Lopez, indicate that the holdings of the state-power wing
often reach the outer limits of her willingness to fight for state autonomy.
E. Justice Thomas
Arguably on the other end of the spectrum of the Court's state-power wing is
Justice Thomas. Where Justices Kennedy and O'Connor urged relative
moderation in Lopez,218 Justice Thomas urged a severe reduction in Congress's
211 Printz, 521 U.S. at 917-18 (hinting that he would like to see the "validity" of
"conditions upon the grant of federal funding" "challenged in a proper case").
212 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568-83 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
213 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
214 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
215 See id. at 574-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
216 See supra part IH.C.
2 17 See infra part lIf.E.
218 SeeLopez, 514 U.S. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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commerce power. 219 In Printz, where Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring
opinion emphasizing the limits of the Court's holding, Justice Thomas not only
reiterated his desire to eviscerate Congress's commerce power, but went so far as
to suggest that the entire Brady Act was unconstitutional.220
Further evidence of Justice Thomas's state-power extremism is that his
dissent in Term Limits22 1 is the only federalism opinion of his that any other
state-power Justice has signed. Every time the state-power wing has been in the
majority in a federalism case-that is, every time a concurring opinion by Justice
Thomas could affect the interpretation of the principal opinion-the other state-
power Justices have avoided supporting his opinions with their signatures. 2
22
On the other hand, in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, Justice Thomas joined Justice
O'Connor's relatively moderate concurring opinion223 in opposition to Justice
Kennedy and the Chief Justice's attack224 on Ex parte Young jurisdiction.
Whereas Justice Kennedy and the Chief Justice wanted to erode individuals'
access to federal court protection against state officers' violations of their federal
rights, Justice Thomas would not go this far in favor of state power. As much as
he is in favor of using the Court to increase state power relative to federal power,
he is wary of leaving to the state courts enforcement of individual federal rights
against violation by state officers.
In his Lopez concurring opinion, Justice Thomas revealed his activist
desires225 by urging that the Court "ought to temper [its] Commerce Clause
jurisprudence." 226 Namely, he thought that the Court's "substantial effects"
test 227 was invalid because it did not comport with his textualist-originalist
2 19 See id. at 584 (Thomas, J., conctuing).
220 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) ('I
question whether Congress can regulate the particular transactions at issue here.'). The
constitutionality of the entire Act was, of course, not before the Court.
221 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845-926 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
222 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 936-39 (Thomas, J., concurring); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549,584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
223 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tnbe, 521 U.S. 261,288-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
224 See id. at 270-80.
225 See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 106-07 ("Presumably, Justice Thomas would overrule
United States v. Darby [, 312 U.S. 100 (1941),] and other decisions interpreting the Commerce
Clause to allow the federal government effectively to exercise a police power over the states").
226 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).




reading of the Commerce Clause.22 8 In his opinion, regardless of the possibility
that "interstate commerce" today is no longer remotely similar to "interstate
commerce" two hundred years ago, we should be bound to the Commerce Clause
as understood two hundred years ago. Interestingly enough, not even Justice
Scalia, notorious advocate of textualism-originalism, agreed with Justice
Thomas's approach to the Commerce Clause.
In his Printz concurring opinion, Justice Thomas reiterated his desire to
fundamentally change the commerce power:
Although this Court has long interpreted the Constitution as ceding Congress
extensive authority to regulate commerce (interstate or otherwise), I continue to
believe that we must 'temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence' and return to an
interpretation better rooted in the Clause's original understanding.2 29
Here, as in Lopez, no other state-power Justice-not even Justice Scalia-lent a
signature in support of Justice Thomas's strong textualist-originalist reading of
the Commerce Clause. It is therefore clear that this is a marked divergence of
federalist theories among the state-power Justices.
In his Term Limits dissent, Justice Thomas revealed his fundamental
disagreement with Justice Kennedy's understanding of constitutional
federalism. 230 Most generally, the disagreement can be summarized as follows:
To the majority [including Justice Kennedy], the set of state powers over the
composition and operation of the federal government was null except as
constitutionally conferred. To the dissent [written by Justice Thomas], the set of state
228,'Even though the boundary between commerce and other matters may ignore
'economic reality' and this seem arbitrary or artificial to some, we must nevertheless respect a
constitutional line that does not grant Congress power over all that substantially affects
interstate commerce." Id. at 593 (Thomas, J., concurring).
229 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
230 Although the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined Justice Thomas's
dissent, this may indicate only the fact of their dissent rather than an agreement with the
theories put forth by Justice Thomas. After all, whenever Justice Thomas writes an opinion on
the majority side of a federalism case, these Justices are careful to withhold their signatures
from such opinions. Adding their signatures to Justice Thomas's Term Limits dissent posed no
risk of increasing his federalism theory's effect on the Court's jurisprudence. It posed no such
risk precisely because it was a dissenting opinion. This note, therefore, avoids inferring, from
their signatures on this dissent, agreement with Justice Thomas's theories underlying his
dissent.
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powers, even over the federal government, was infinite except as constitutionally
surrendered. 23
1
More specifically, the disagreement between Justice Thomas and Justice
Kennedy that led to the latter joining the usual federalism-dissenters is based on
Justice Kennedy's dual republicanism. Whereas Justice Kennedy argues that
American citizens have two independent "political capacities, one state and one
federal, each protected from incursion by the other,"232 Justice Thomas argues
that "the people of the several States are the only true source of power. '233
Therefore, Justice Thomas believes that state citizenship is primary: citizens of
states have political power only as citizens of states. 234
Justice Thomas therefore emerges most pronouncedly as having an extreme
state-power Commerce Clause theory relative to the other state-power Justices.
He would severely reduce Congress's power to regulate activity under the
commerce power, whereas his fellow state-power Justices seem to worry only
about vaguely keeping the commerce power from being universal.2 35 As part of
this divergence of federalism theories, it is interesting to see that Justice Thomas
goes much further than Justice Scalia in terms of a textualist-originalist approach
to the Commerce Clause. Also, Justice Thomas seems to be the strongest
advocate of the theory of "primordial sovereignty of the states,"236 a theory
generally held at least by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia and perhaps
by Justice O'Connor, but certainly not by Justice Kennedy. Finally, with Justices
Scalia and O'Connor, Justice Thomas also emerges as a protector of Ex parte
Young federal jurisdiction in suits against state officers.
Justice Thomas's federalism theory is thus another excellent example of the
great and complex divergence of federalism theories among the state-power
Justices who are creating federalist law. The next section examines this complex
divergent set of theories as a whole and explicitly argues for a conclusion that
should already be apparent: the state-power majority itself has no coherent theory
behind the body of federalist law it has been creating. However, it also argues
that this result should not be surprising.
231 Sullivan, supra note 16, at 91.
232 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
233 Ia at 847 (Thomas, j., dissenting).
2 34 Supra note 39.
23 5 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) ("Thus, if we were to accept the
Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by any individual that
Congress is without power to regulate.").
236 Sullivan, supra note 16, at 109.
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IV. CONCLUSION: RESULTS EMERGING FROM THEORIES CONVERGING
Although the same five Justices have joined almost universally to make the
recent important decisions in favor of increased state sovereignty, there is no
single official theory of federalism universally endorsed by a majority of the
Court. This, of course, is a necessary result of the structure of the Supreme Court,
but one that is often overlooked by commentators who purport to find crucial
theoretical inconsistencies from one decision to the next.237 Of course, the
common law system should not permit surface inconsistencies between cases.
However, this does not mean that the emergent theories-i.e., theories emerging
from converging theories of individual Justices-underlying the cases need be
consistent. Because of this common law structure whereby law is made by
majority vote on perhaps no more than a case-specific result, the Supreme
Court's federalism jurisprudence is confusingly complex.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has no theoretical basis discoverable in the current
Court's federalism decisions. 238 At most, these decisions show him universally
to advocate a results-based one-way ratchet in favor of increased state power.
We know that Justice Scalia has at least his formalist theory of textualism-
originalism. However, this doctrine does not always get him very far on the
federalism question.239 His votes have been identical to those of the Chief Justice
but with one fascinating difference: he would preserve federal courts' Ex parte
Young jurisdiction to hear individuals' cases against states in the name of state
officers.240 "Young is commonly seen as a kind of civil rights facilitator,"241 and
this may explain the odd alignment of the state-power Justices in Coeur d'Alene
Tribe.242
Justice Thomas applies hard-core textualism-originalism where even Justice
Scalia would not, and thus comes up with a radically reduced reading of
Congress's Commerce Clause power-a reading supported by no other
237 See Jackson, supra note 5, at 2228 ("In a polity that, at different times and for
different reasons, values federalism to different degrees, caution is needed in urging any unified
theory of federalism on the Court."). The footnote to this remark includes a brief list of
commentators who have urged a unified theory upon finding inconsistencies from one decision
to the next. Id. at 2228 n.215. Note, though, that Professor Jackson nevertheless wrote that "the
Court's task is to articulate a flexible doctrine that helps maintain the pragmatic dynamism of
federalism." Id. However, as this note shows, the Court's majority has failed to articulate any
doctrine of federalism at all; rather it agrees only on case results while arguing over doctrine.
238 See supra Part IR.A.
239 See supra Part ITI.C.
240 See supra Part II.D.
241 Hovenkamp, supra note 25, at 2246.
242 See supra Part ll.D.
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Justice.243 However, as extreme as Justice Thomas's commerce power
aspirations may be, he, too, would preserve the federal courts' Ex parte Young
jurisdiction over state officers.
Although Justice O'Connor was viewed early on as a indefatigable defender
of state power,244 she led the way in protecting Ex parte Young jurisdiction
against the assault by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist.245 And,
furthermore, more than any other state-power Justice, she has signed or written
concurring opinions expressing disagreement with the doctrines behind the
principal opinions, urging moderation, and limiting the Court's holding in these
cases increasing state power.246
Justice Kennedy turns out to have probably the most developed theoretical
basis for his federalism decisions, which leads him to be the least results-based
Justice on the state-power wing.2 47 This, of course, also leads him to be a
surprisingly independent voice on the state-power wing, not remotely aligned
with any other. His adherence to his "two-way ratchef' dual republicanism led
him to launch the unsuccessful assault on Exparte Young jurisdiction248 and also
led to the only break down of the state-power wing, in Term Limits.2 49
Rather than finding a coherent theoretical basis undergirding the Court's
several recent increases in state power, we find instead a bare majority that can
agree on little more than the case-specific results in favor of increased state
power. With the exception of most of the non-Young Eleventh Amendment
cases, -2 50 the Justices in the state-power majority regularly write concurring
opinions in which they register their disagreement with the theoretical bases
behind the principal opinions they signed. This hardly feels like solid law. When
the majority agrees on little more than the case-specific results, there is no
majority theory from which to usefully extrapolate. Although it may be a
necessary result of our common law system of judicial decision-making, it is
243 See supra Part II.E.
244 See supra Part II.D.
245 See supra Part 1I.D.
246 See supra Part lM.D.
247 See supra Part III.B.
248 See supra Part J.D.
249 See supra Part II.B.
250 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Coll. Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Says. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996). Even in the two most recent Eleventh Amendment cases, Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001), and Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), members of the state-power quintet have broken rank and written
concurring opinions.
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troubling to see so many changes in federalist law unaccompanied by the
guidance of any federalist doctrine.
